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THE GROLIER SOCIETY INC. Publishers

Grolier Building 575 Lexington Avenue, New York 22, N. Y. PLaza 1-3600

June 2, 1959

The Director of Information
Central Intelligence Agency
2430 E Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

Dear Sir:

We are planning to publish an article entitled
"The Intelligence Problem" by Mr. Garrett
Underhill in the Encyclopedia Year Book, 1960
and are now preparing the illustrations.

We know that the function of your organization
prohibits much publicity, but are wondering if
you have any charts or picture material that we
could use.

Any assistance you can give us is very much ap-
preciated. Thank you for a reply at your early
convenience.

Yours truly,


Mary C. Bowen (Mrs.)
Picture Editor

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WORLD IN TURMOIL

TOP SECRET

By ARTHUR T. HADLEY


Periscope Editor, Newsweek Magazine

One hydrogen bomb could knock out Great Britain; twenty could paralyze the United States. It could well be a matter of survival for the United States to learn the hour at which an enemy nation would strike. The world hopes that such an attack will never happen. If it should, however, and the United States is warned in time, that warning would come from the most secret of all government organizations, the Central Intelligence Agency. If a certain number of enemy planes were to explode mysteriously on their flight to drop their bombs, 150,000,000 lives might be saved.

The mere mention of the initials CIA makes people in Washington look quickly over their shoulders. It also produces some snickers, for like any secret—and the business of spying must be secret even in its most humdrum phases—CIA is often misunderstood. Some jeer at it; others credit it with almost supernatural powers. Both attitudes are oversimplifications, the result of the secrecy surrounding the organization.


This secrecy is prodigious. The size of CIA's budget is secret, even from most members of Congress. The exact number of employees is secret, as are the names of many of its top directors. What it is doing is secret, and so is the location of most of its buildings. CIA has its own secret schools, secret phone book, secret airplane squadron and codes. Within the organization itself, people in one office have no idea what those in the next office are doing. Only a few top officials have passes that are good for all CIA buildings. Two tough presidential commissions have recently found CIA free of subversion, but its officials are taking no chances that Communists may learn what goes on inside.

Behind all the secrecy, CIA is a government agency much like any other. It merely happens to be engaged in a little rougher



PHILIP CENDREAU

ENCYCLOPEDIA YEAR BOOK, 1956
(GROLIER SOCIETY)



HARRIS AND EWING
ALLEN W. DULLES, Director of the CIA

work. It has two of the same problems as all government agencies—money and men. It never has quite so much money as it thinks it needs, and it has a terrible time getting able men to work for it.

About 25,000 men are on the payrolls of the CIA. All of them, from janitors through agents, analysts, planners and research experts, are paid according to government pay scales. Recruiting, especially of top people, is difficult. Few men want to leave high-paid civilian jobs to work for from \$8,000 to \$10,000 a year. Because of the secrecy, no one outside will know it if you happen to be doing wonderful work. You cannot talk to your wife about office problems, provided, of course, that you ever have time to see her. If you want to take another job, you will not be able to tell your future employer what you have been doing. In addition, most intelligence work, although it sounds exciting, is of a routine dullness that discourages all but the most dedicated.

Heading the CIA is Allen W. Dulles, pipe-smoking, tweedy professional diplomat and spy. Allen went through the same early rigorous training in diplomacy as did his older brother, John Foster Dulles, the Secretary of State. CIA Dulles looks much like his brother,

though he is rather fuller in the face and sports a British professorial mustache.

Allen Dulles' wartime espionage activities in Geneva, Switzerland, are legendary. He was in touch with the anti-Nazi group plotting the assassination of Hitler. He discovered that the Germans had broken important United States codes, and he also located a secret radio station in Eire that was broadcasting to Nazi U-boats. From what he picked up in Geneva he figured out that the United States was working on the atomic bomb.

As deputy, Dulles has one of the former intelligence experts of the Pentagon, Air Force Lieutenant General Charles P. Cabell, who used to head the intelligence section of the Air Force. Cabell is famous as a tough administrator. His presence is also an admission that finding people to serve is a major CIA problem. Key jobs all through the organization are held by Army, Navy and Air Force personnel. These officers, disciplined by their military life, can be ordered to serve in tough and unpleasant jobs that few civilians would touch.

The CIA came into being to fill a large hole in the American government set-up, which had no intelligence agency. The State Department, the armed services, the Atomic Energy Commission, the FBI, all gathered intelligence, but no agency told any other about what it had found. Worse still, no one put all the facts together in one report that the President and his top advisors could read. Bits and pieces, which by themselves meant little, were never put together in one integrated whole. Right after the war, a Central Intelligence Group was formed, with only a small staff. This gradually evolved into the Central Intelligence Agency, though CIA was not set up on a permanent basis by act of Congress until 1949.

Before then it had at best merely limped along. As chiefs it had a series of leaders who knew little of intelligence and whose interests lay elsewhere. It was not until the earthy, severe General Bedell Smith, President Eisenhower's former chief of staff in Europe, took over in September 1950 that the agency really started to hum. That humming has continued under Allen Dulles.

CIA is divided into two distinct parts, known to those familiar with it as white

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and black. By far the largest part is white. This section takes material from all over the world and tries to make sense out of it. Diplomatic reports from Iran, technical journals from Poland, the report of a student returned from Russia, the latest Paris scandal, newspapers of all nations, Department of Agriculture crop estimates for Italy, the latest book on Austria—all this mountain of information has to be given meaning, so that it can be used by those who plan American policy.

The other side of CIA—the black—is the part that fiction writers love. Here are the real spies. This completely secret side of CIA is further broken down into two entirely separate parts, the active and the passive. Passive secret intelligence is the gathering of information by agents who listen in cafés, who watch Red convoys behind the iron curtain, who plant microphones in the apartments of prime ministers. Passive intelligence is quiet listening.

Active secret intelligence is dangerous doing. The active agents are the cold-war infantry of the United States. If a series of "quicky" strikes ties up uranium refining in Czechoslovakia, an active CIA agent may well have been the strike leader. If you hear news of guerrilla groups in Red China, you can know that probably an active CIA agent is confidential adviser to the Chinese in command. If leaflets exposing a leading communist politician in Western Europe as a dope salesman suddenly appear on the streets of a foreign town, they were probably printed on a CIA press by CIA active agents.

Being an agent is no job for weaklings. There are casualties every month. A passive agent, merely looking and reporting, is most effective if he stays hidden in one spot for years. But an active agent is going to be known the very first time he heaves a bomb. Both active and passive agents of the CIA are mainly located abroad. It is the FBI's job to watch Communists at home.

Though the black side is the most glamorous and spectacular, it is the white side that, in the opinion of experts, is the most important and has the greatest effect on what the Government does next. Every day CIA intelligence analysts are trying to piece together the little, unrelated facts that could

mean life or death for the United States. For months they work on a simple, yet all-important question, such as: Who really runs Russia? Experts in charge of various areas of the world keep up-to-the-minute reports on what is going on inside every country. These reports become "national estimates" giving the strength and weaknesses of most countries in the world. Each week CIA publishes a secret intelligence bulletin summarizing the trouble spots of the world and predicting what will happen in them next.

No problem bothers CIA more than what is going on inside the Soviet Union. Information on Russia is difficult to get. Each week the President's top advisers on the security of the United States—the National Security Council—meet with him in the White House. Each week Allen Dulles leads off the council meeting by reporting what the Communists are doing.

No one in the Pentagon or State Department can make a really important recommendation to the President without first consulting CIA to get the enemy side of the picture. Bedell Smith used to remark in all seriousness that each week facts came to his desk that indicated that war would start the next day. Several times CIA has flashed the "this is it" warning to American military commanders around the world. While the agency does not want to cry wolf too often, it cannot afford to take chances. CIA has an awesome responsibility—and it can't be wrong once.

Should the ultimate horror occur and war come, CIA would merely expand the activity of its black agents. There would be more of them working behind enemy lines and fewer back home evaluating, since the information to evaluate would be limited. Beyond this, there would be no major change either in organization or work. During the Korean war, for example, clandestine activities were expanded and nets of agents were put behind the North Korean lines. When peace came to Korea, fighting stopped for the armed services. But CIA's job went on. It had to find out what was going on in North Korea and, if possible, to slow down the communist development of that country. In the CIA no one wonders what will happen if war comes. They feel they are in World War III now.